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4. Privacy and the global media in 
the information age
The protection of privacy is being increasingly recognised worldwide 
by the courts, and media regulators, as a result of what is seen as a more 
powerful and intrusive media, and the effect of the internet. A right to 
privacy may even apply in a public place. This article examines the impact 
this has on the media in the information age? New Zealand now has a 
tort of interference with privacy. The criminal courts are also considering 
privacy values in issues ranging from suppression orders to release of 
court information to the public. The Broadcasting Standards Authority has 
revised its privacy principles. Codes of conduct with regard to the print 
media also acknowledge privacy. But the protection of privacy has its 
genesis in the 1890s and not in the digital age. A seminal article by Warren 
and Brandeis, ‘The Right to Privacy’ (1890), was a reaction to what was 
at that time seen as an over-powerful media. United States jurisprudence 
evolved to the Prosser and Keeton formulation in the 1960s. New Zealand 
jurisprudence has relied on this formulation to advance privacy rights. 
The English courts have taken a similar approach in the much publicised 
Douglas v Hello! and Naomi Campbell cases. The European courts, as a 
reaction to an overactive paparazzi, have pushed the bounds of privacy in 
the Peck and Princess Caroline cases. The High Court of Australia con-
sidered privacy in Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd.  Finally, the International 
Covenants and protection of privacy. 
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Introduction
WE ARE all conscious of the vital importance of freedom of expression, and of a free press as fundamental in any free and democratic society and all the more so in the digital age.  The 
importance of freedom of expression is well established in our common law 
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jurisprudence.  John Stuart Mill (On Liberty, 1859) believed that freedom of 
expression was necessary in order to facilitate the discovery of the truth:
[T]he peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it 
is robbing the human race;  posterity as well as the existing generation;  
those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it.  If 
the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging 
error for truth:  if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a beneﬁ t, 
the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its 
collision with error.1
In Abrams v United States (1919)2, Justice O. W. Holmes, one of Americaʼs 
outstanding jurists, referred to the importance of freedom of expression in 
establishing a ʻmarketplace of ideas  ʼfrom which truth could emerge:  
The best test of the truth is the power of the thought to get itself 
accepted in the competition of the market.
In Judicial Remedies and the Constitution (1994) a prominent English 
jurist, Sir John Laws, argues that freedom of expression is an end in itself—an 
inalienable right:
Free speech is a corollary of the power of reason, of intellect, which is 
as natural in Man as the power of muscles and sinews, though altogether 
more important.  And it is a necessary condition for the very exercise 
of reason that its possessor should have the faculty to communicate, 
since reason only has effect through language. Thus, free speech is a 
moral construct whose existence depends upon and is required by the 
fact that humanity is social, not solitary.  It is not a means to an end, but 
an end in itself.  Without it humanity is not humanity.  It may therefore 
be described as an inalienable right (p. 226).
New Zealand has a Bill of Rights.  Freedom of expression in our Bill of 
Rights is broad based.
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom 
to seek, receive, and impart information and opinions of any kind in 
any form.
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Pursuant to section 4 of the Bill of Rights, our courts are obliged to 
interpret and apply other legislation as consistently as possible with free-
dom of expression rights.  And those rights may be subject only to such 
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justiﬁ ed in a 
free and democratic society (section 5, Bill of Rights). The issue that needs 
to be considered is whether a right to privacy, or a right to be let alone, is a 
reasonable limitation on freedom of expression rights which is justiﬁ ed, in a 
free and democratic society.
We are all conscious of the claim that the media today is all powerful, 
all intrusive, and all ratings/commercially driven.  This, it is said, is to the 
detriment of individual privacy and ultimately to the detriment of society 
as a whole.  The claim is made that the search for the truth, and the public 
interest are no longer the imperatives of a free press.  Whether these claims 
have any basis will depend on our own close experience of working in and 
with the media.
There must be a concern, however, that such a critical perception of the 
media will inﬂ uence the courts and legislative bodies to reign in the media 
when it comes to issues of privacy, personal dignity and claims for personal 
autonomy and anonymity.  Witness, for example, Justice Callinan of the High 
Court of Australia in ABC v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001)3:
The means and sources of information (both legitimate and 
unlawful) available to the media are more numerous and diverse 
today than ever before:  spy cameras, telephone interception devices, 
access to satellites, night vision equipment, thermal imaging, parabolic 
listening devices, telephoto lenses, and concealable video cameras to 
name only some.  The means of instantaneous communication have 
been greatly enhanced in the last century.  That taken with the great 
ﬁ nancial and other resources available to media organisations should, 
if anything, enable the margin for factual error to be much reduced.  It 
should also be pointed out that photographs, and video ﬁ lms and other 
reproductions can be very valuable in the hands of many branches of 
the media, especially this syndicated media. 
As populations expand, privacy becomes more elusive. The right 
to grant or refuse access to, and to allow to be published, accounts, 
or records, whether by way of ﬁ lm, sound recording, drawings, or 
otherwise, of what is occurring at a location at a particular time are 
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rights for which very large sums of money can be demanded.  These 
rights, however they might be described in proprietary terms, can be 
very valuable indeed.  Some understanding of all of these matters is 
necessary for any discussion about, and a statement of the law with 
respect to, freedom of expression, privacy, new forms of property and 
defamation.
And:
Much news is in any event provided by overseas services and multi-
national companies.  Wholesale comment, speculation, informed and 
uninformed, on the part of the authors of articles and daily newspapers 
seems to be encouraged.  There are few articles today reporting what 
people have said that are free from the authors interpretation of, or, to 
adopt the parlance of the media, ‘spin’ on it.  This may be a consequence 
of the fact that almost all reporters, even the most inexperienced, are 
given a by-line, a practice almost unknown a generation or so ago.
As stated whether or not we agree with Justice Callinan is a matter of 
individual experience.  As Baroness Hale said in the Naomi Campbell (2002)4
case: ʻOne reason why press freedom is so important is that we need news-
papers to sell in order to ensure that we still have newspapers at all.  ʼThe 
point however is that the desire to protect privacy, and to be left alone, is fun-
damental in both the civil and criminal context.  But, freedom of expression 
is not itself some convenient byline to be eroded by a rush to privacy.  What 
is crucial, and sometimes very difﬁ cult, is achieving in practice an accept-
able balance between the competing interests in any given circumstances.  
I will now review some of the broad and perhaps more high proﬁ le 
developments overseas and in New Zealand with regard to privacy law under 
the following headings.  
The genesis of privacy law in an article written by Warren and 
Brandeis in the United States in 1890; and the Prosser and Keeton 
formulation in 1960.
Jacqueline Onassis, and adoptive parents in the United States.
One photograph in Canada which made its way from Quebec to the 
Canadian Supreme Court.
Venables, Michael Douglas and Catherine Zeta-Jones, and Naomi 
Campbell, in the United Kingdom.
•
•
•
•
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Some CCTV footage in England that made its way to the European 
Court.
Game meat in Tasmania—the High Court of Australia decision in 
Lenah Game Meats.
The position in New Zealand and, in particular, the Court of Appeal 
landmark decision in Hosking v Runting.
The international covenants on privacy.
I stress I can only touch on some interesting cases simply to highlight 
the issues.  We would need a few days to make it a comprehensive study. 
However, it can readily be seen that privacy values and interests have 
already impacted on the media, and will continue to impact upon freedom of 
expression rights, as the Legislature and Courts strive to seek a balance between 
freedom of expression in the information age, and the ability of individual 
citizens to personal autonomy, dignity and privacy.  As one of the Law Lords 
in the House of Lords said in the Naomi Campbell case:
This case involves the familiar competition between freedom of 
expression and respect for an individual’s privacy.  Both are vitally 
important rights.  Neither has precedence over the other.  The importance 
of freedom of expression has been stressed often and eloquently, the 
importance of privacy less so.  But it, too, lies at the heart of liberty in a 
modern state.  A proper degree of privacy is essential for the well-being 
and development of an individual.
The starting point: Warren and Brandeis
The genesis of privacy law is the seminal article ʻThe Right to Privacy  ʼ
(1890) 4 Harv. LR 94 by Warren and Brandeis, which was based principally 
on the proposition that an individual has a ʻ right to be let aloneʼ.  Even at that 
time, in the 1890s, the authors believed that recent inventions such as instant 
photographs and the activities of newspapers were increasingly intrusive and 
a threat to a so-called right to be let alone.  Warren and Brandeis observed:
The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing 
civilisation, have rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and 
man, under the reﬁ ning inﬂ uence of culture, has become more sensitive 
to publicity, so that solitude and privacy have become more essential 
to the individual; but modern enterprise and invention have, through 
invasions upon his privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress, 
far greater than could be inﬂ icted by mere bodily injury.
•
•
•
•
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This article was regarded as one of the most inﬂ uential treatises in the 
law forming the basis of American jurisprudence on privacy.  The article 
concluded that:
The protection afforded to thoughts, sentiments and emotions, expressed 
through the medium of writing or of the arts, so far as it consists of 
preventing publication, is merely an instance of the enforcement of the 
more general right of the individual to be let alone.
Prosser and Keeton
Although the United States courts acknowledged privacy values, 
particularly via the Fourth Amendment concerned with unlawful search and 
seizure, the major development in the civil jurisdiction on the tort of invasion of 
privacy was the Prosser and Keeton formulation.  The basis for this formula-
tion was an article by Dean William Prosser in 1960 (48 Californian LR 383). 
Prosserʼs article, like Warren and Brandeis, had a profound impact on 
privacy law in general.  Prosser identiﬁ ed four privacy torts:
Intrusion upon the plaintiffʼs seclusion or solitude, or into his 
private affairs.
Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff.
Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye.
Appropriation, for the defendantʼs advantage, of the plaintiffʼs name 
or likeness.
Looking at each of these in turn:
The essence of the ﬁ rst tort is not publication, but intrusion, eg, 
interception of private discussions, peering into windows, harassing 
telephone calls.
With the second tort, the protected interest is reputation. Prosser 
saw the tort as an extension of defamation areas not covered by 
defamation.  It crucially eliminated the defence of truth.
The third tort also protected reputation.  The concern of course was 
that if taken to its extreme, the careful balance achieved in the law 
of defamation would be decimated.  There was a risk that freedom 
of the press would simply disappear.
The fourth tort is that of appropriation—the interest protected is a 
proprietary one.  In todayʼs world, pirating of a plaintiffʼs identity.
Prosser’s four broad concepts have now been substantially incorporated 
as ss652A to 652E in the US Restatement of the Law, Second Torts.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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The United States: Jacqueline Onassis and an adoption case
With the Warren and Brandeis seminal article, and the Prosser and Keeton 
formulation, the origins of the tort of invasion of privacy are in the United 
States. The First Amendmentʼs freedom of expression values remains para-
mount. The Fourth Amendment with regard to search and seizure, however, 
protects privacy.  See for example:
Olmstead v United States (1928)5—ʻthe right to be alone—the most 
comprehensive of rights, and the right most valued by civilised 
manʼ.
Public Utilities Commission v Pollack (1952)6—ʻthe right to be let 
alone is indeed the beginning of all freedomʼ.
Two cases of interest which recognised a right to privacy involved 
paparazzi harassment of Jacqueline Onassis Ronald E. Galella v Jacqueline 
Onassis (1982)7; and the right to keep private facts buried in the absence of 
any compelling reason for media publicity Hall v Post (1987)8.
Having been constantly harassed by the paparazzi, Jackie Onassis obtained 
an order prohibiting Galella from harassing, alarming, blocking her path, 
touching her person, or coming within a certain distance of her, her children 
or her residence.  The court held that the photographer deliberately and persist-
ently violated the court order by actions and conduct offensive, menacing and 
contemptuous, and was held in contempt. The court considered other cases 
which addressed the issue of surreptitious news gatherers:
Under certain circumstances, surveillance may be so over zealous as 
to render it actionable ... it does not strain credulity or imagination to 
conceive of this systematic ‘public’ surveillance of another as being the 
implementation of a plan to intrude on the privacy of another.
The court concluded at p. 45:
Mrs Onassis is invested with a constitutional right to privacy—a right 
to be left alone.  The right of privacy stands on high ground, cognate 
to the values and concerns protected by constitutional guarantees.  
Indeed, her ‘right to be left alone’ is exactly what Galella relentlessly 
and shockingly invaded...
In Hall v Post (1987) an adoptive mother and daughter brought an action 
•
•
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against a newspaper and reporter alleging invasion of privacy by disclosure 
of private facts concerning an adoption which occurred 17 years prior to the 
article.  The Court of Appeal of North Carolina held there was an invasion of 
privacy. It considered the difference between information to which the public 
was entitled to have, and morbid and sensational prying into private lives for 
its own sake.  The court referred to the California Supreme Court in Briscoe 
v Readers Digest9:
In a nation built upon the free dissemination of ideas, it is always 
difﬁ cult to declare that something may not be published.  But the great 
general interest in an unfettered press may at times be outweighed by 
other great societal interests.  As people we have come to recognise that 
one of these societal interests is that of protecting an individual’s right 
to privacy. The right to know and the right not to have others not know 
are, simplistically considered, irreconcilable.  But the rights guaranteed 
by the First Amendment do not require total abrogation of the right to 
privacy. The goals sought by each may be achieved with a minimum 
of intrusion upon the other.
The court continued:
In our view, there are private matters so intimate or personal that the 
obvious bounds of propriety and decency require their protection from 
public scrutiny in the absence of any compelling justiﬁ cation for their 
revelation.
The court said:
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that in an appropriate case, an 
unwarranted and offensive publication of private facts which are not 
newsworthy may give rise to a claim for relief for tortuous invasion 
of privacy entitling the aggrieved party to at least nominal damages, 
and that plaintiffs have alleged sufﬁ cient facts to support this type of 
claim.
I now move north of the border to Canada.
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Canada: The Supreme Court and one photograph from Quebec
In Canada, the function of privacy has been equated with the fostering of 
personal autonomy and self development, essential for the well-being of the 
individual in society. It has also been described as at the heart of liberty 
in a modern state.  The Supreme Court of Canada decision in Les Editions 
Vice-Versa Inc and Duclos v Aubry (1998)10 is of importance.  The case was an 
appeal from Quebec.  It is based on the Quebec Charter which in turn reﬂ ects 
the long-standing acceptance in French law (which it has in common with 
German law) that privacy rights warrant broad legal protection (and thus 
may not be binding on the other Canadian provinces).
The claimant brought an action against a publisher for taking and publish-
ing without her consent a photograph of her sitting in a public place. The court 
held that the taking of the photo, and the publishing of it, both constituted an 
invasion of the plaintiff’s right to privacy.  The court considered whether the 
right to one’s image was a separate right of personality or an element of the 
right to privacy. In the court’s view the right to one’s image was an element 
of the right to privacy the claimant recovered damages. 
England: Venables, Douglas and Zeta-Jones, Naomi Campbell
The English Court of Appeal and House of Lords have considered some 
high proﬁ le cases involving privacy. The English courts have been guided 
very much by Article 8 of the European Convention which protects ʻprivate 
and family lifeʼ, and the law of conﬁ dence as including privacy rights. In 
Venables v News Group  (2001)11, the claimants, who were the young 
murderers of the toddler Jamie Bolger, sought to prevent newspapers 
from disclosing information about their new lives. The court held that the 
risk to the claimants  ʼ lives and their right to life required that the right to 
conﬁ dence protecting the disclosure of their new identities took precedence 
over the right of the media to free expression. In Douglas v Hello! Ltd 
(2001)12, the court held Michael Douglas and Catherine Zeta-Jones had an 
actionable right to privacy and damages over their wedding photographs. 
The court said the privacy right emanated from the common law action of 
breach of conﬁ dence, either independently or bolstered by the provisions of 
the Human Rights Act 1998. In Campbell v MGN Ltd (2004), supermodel 
Naomi Campbell successfully claimed damages for breach of privacy by the 
publication of articles and photos revealing that, contrary to her claims, she 
was a drug addict and was attending meetings for Narcotics Anonymous.  
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Europe: The European Court and some CCTV footage
The decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Peck v United 
Kingdom, (2003)13 reﬂ ects the much stronger European tradition with regard 
to privacy rights.  A reasonable expectation of privacy may arise notwith-
standing the public locality in which the ʻinvasion  ʼof privacy takes place.
The ECHR ruled that a British man’s right to respect for his private life 
was violated when CCTV footage of him in a distraught state in a public place, 
a street, was released to the media. (The footage did not actually show an 
attempted suicide.)  Peck was not aware that he had been ﬁ lmed by a closed-
circuit television camera installed by a local council.  The council issued two 
photographs taken from the footage with an article entitled ‘Defused—the 
partnership between CCTV and the police prevents a potentially dangerous 
situation’.  Peck’s face was identiﬁ able. Two local newspapers published the 
photographs and it was also issued to Anglia TV (but with Peck’s face be-
ing masked). The footage was also supplied to the BBC series Crime Beat. 
In trailers for the series, Peck’s face was identiﬁ able. The European Court 
upheld the complaint on the basis that a disclosure of the CCTV footage to 
the media constituted a ‘disproportionate and unjustiﬁ ed interference with the 
applicant’s private life’ in violation of Article 8 of the European Convention 
of Human Rights.  The court said that there was a zone of interaction of a 
person with others, even in a public context, which may fall within the scope 
of ‘private life’.
Australia: The High Court in Lenah Game Meats Ltd
The Australian High Court considered invasion of privacy in Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Limited (2001).  Lenah 
Game Meats applied for an injunction to stop the broadcast of covert ﬁ lming 
carried out by ABC of Lenahʼs game works in Tasmania.  The six judges of 
the High Court had different approaches, but Justices Gummow and Hayne 
(Caudron J concurring) considered:
The remaining categories, the disclosure of private facts and 
unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion, perhaps come closest to 
reﬂ ecting a concern for privacy as a legal principle drawn from the 
fundamental value of personal autonomy.
Justice Kirby recognised that the right of privacy is drawn from the 
fundamental value of personal autonomy.  He considered that ﬁ lmed 
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images which are surreptitiously obtained are deemed to be conﬁ dential 
information, and that a person who comes into possession with knowledge 
of the conﬁ dential nature of such information, may come under a duty not to 
publish.  As I referred to in the introduction, Callinan J was highly critical of 
the media in his dissenting judgment, and considered that the tort of invasion 
of privacy should apply in Australia.  
Reference should also be made to a lower court decision in Queensland 
Grosse v Purvis (2003)14.  A Queensland District Court judge became the ﬁ rst 
judge in Australia to ﬁ nd that people can sue for the tort of invasion of their 
privacy.  Judge Skoien ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff $178,000 for 
the invasion of her privacy and other torts for a post traumatic stress disorder 
as a result of harassment and stalking.
The New Zealand position
There were a number of cases in New Zealand prior to Hosking v Runting15
that recognised a privacy right, particularly where freedom of expression 
rights have been in issue in the criminal context. Two examples will sufﬁ ce. 
In Police v OʼConnor (1992)16, one of New Zealandʼs leading jurists, Justice 
Thomas, in a very full decision on the principle of open administration of 
justice, stated:  ʻNor will the principle (of freedom of expression) invari-
ably prevail against the citizenʼs right to privacy and the public interest in 
a law which protects privacy.  ʼ In Television New Zealand Ltd v R (1996)17, 
our Court of Appeal was required to consider an application by the media to 
publish ʻevidence  ʼthat had been ruled inadmissible in a murder trial.  The 
accused (David Bain) had stood trial for the murder of his parents, brother 
and two sisters.  In the course of the trial the defence had sought to adduce 
evidence of a hearsay nature in support of its contention that the father was 
the real killer (to hide an alleged incestuous relationship with one of the 
sisters who had been murdered).  Relying on the twin principles of freedom 
of expression and open administration of justice, the Court of Appeal ruled 
that the inadmissible evidence should be made available to the media. On the 
issue of privacy, the court stated:
[The immediate family of the deceased] concern about the prospect of 
further wounding disclosures affecting their family dignity and privacy 
was communicated to us by the Crown.
We were referred to a helpful elaboration of the concept of privacy 
prepared by the Broadcasting Standards Authority ... The ﬁ rst of its 
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principles is that the protection of privacy includes legal protection 
against the public disclosure of private facts where the facts disclosed 
are highly offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person of 
ordinary sensibilities.
There can be no doubt that the alleged facts in issue in the present 
application do fall within the last part of that statement.  But the 
criminal justice system itself requires that some highly offensive facts, 
once private, do become public.  That happens, as in this case, in ac-
cordance with the tenets of public justice in the fair hearing of the cases 
presented by the prosecution and the defence.
In 2003 the Court of Appeal heard the Hosking v Runting case, giving 
its decision in March 2004.  Mike Hosking, a media personality, and his 
wife brought an action on behalf of their small daughters to stop Paciﬁ c 
Magazines Ltd publishing photos of Mrs Marie Hosking and the 
children that had been taken by professional photographer Simon Runting in 
Broadway, Newmarket. The High Court found that the law in New Zealand 
did not recognise a tort of invasion of privacy. Three judges in the Court of 
Appeal, however, considered that there should be such a tort. The other two 
judges thought otherwise. 
In the leading judgment, Justices Gault and Blanchard said that 
there were two fundamental requirements for a successful claim for 
interference with privacy:
The existence of facts in respect of which there is a reasonable 
expectation of privacy; and
Publicity given to those private facts that would be considered 
highly offensive to an objective reasonable person.
These two judges said no court can prescribe all the boundaries of a cause 
of action in a single decision and that the claim will evolve through future 
decisions as courts assess the nature and impact of particular circumstances. 
They emphasised however that they are concerned only with wrongful 
publicity given to private lives.  They are not concerned at this time with 
unreasonable intrusion into a person’s solitude or seclusion.  In many instances 
this aspect of privacy will be protected by the torts of nuisance, or trespass, 
or by laws against harassment, but this may not always be the case.  Justices 
Gault and Blanchard said that private facts are those that may be known to 
•
•
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some people, but not to the world at large. There is no simple test for what 
constitutes a private fact. They further say that the right to privacy is not 
automatically lost when a person is a public ﬁ gure, but his or her reasonable 
expectation of privacy in relation to many areas of life will be correspond-
ingly reduced as public status increases. Involuntary public ﬁ gures may also 
experience a lessening of expectations of privacy, but not ordinarily to the 
extent of those who willingly put themselves in the spotlight.  They say the 
special position of children must not be lost sight of.
The concern of the law so far as these two judges are concerned is 
with widespread publicity of very personal and private matters. Similarly 
publicity, even extensive publicity of matters which, although private, are 
not really sensitive should not give rise to legal liability. The concern is with 
publicity that is truly humiliating and distressful or otherwise harmful to the 
individual concerned.
Most importantly there should be available in cases of interference with 
privacy a defence enabling publication to be justiﬁ ed by a legitimate public 
concern in the information, but not where it is merely interesting to the public. 
In summary, as these two judges saw it, the reasons for recognising a tort of 
invasion of privacy were as follows; it is consistent with our obligations under 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; it is a development 
that the Law Commission has recognised; it reﬂ ects the experience of the 
Broadcasting Standards Authority and similar British tribunals; it enables 
competing values to be reconciled; and it is the same as what has taken place 
in the United Kingdom under the breach of conﬁ dence claims.
Justice Tipping also held that a tort of invasion of privacy exists.  To him 
the ﬁ rst and fundamental ingredient of the tort should be that the plaintiff 
must be able to show a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of the 
information or material which the defendant has published or wishes to publish. 
The necessary expectation can arise from the nature of the information or 
material or the circumstances in which the defendant came into possession of 
it or both.  In most cases that expectation is unlikely to arise unless publication 
would cause a high or substantial level of offence.  It should be a defence to 
an action for invasion of privacy that the information or material published 
about the plaintiff’s private life is a matter of legitimate public concern.
The two dissenting judges took the view that the tort was an 
unjustiﬁ ed limit on the right to freedom of expression as per section 14 of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act.
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The New Zealand courts have not been shy when extending the reach 
of privacy law even prior to Hosking. A lower court decision in 200218 was 
over photos taken by a defendant of the claimant when she was working as a 
prostitute. The photographs focused on her private parts.  Identiﬁ cation was 
extremely unlikely. The court found that there was a breach of privacy when 
the photographs were sent to a magazine. There was absolutely no public 
interest in the publication of the photographs, and given the claimant’s lack 
of consent, the defendant was liable for invasion of privacy. 
In Bradley v Wingnut Films (1993)19, Wingnut, (an early Peter Jackson 
company) produced a ‘splatter’ ﬁ lm, Brain Dead, which included ﬁ lm shot 
in a cemetery. The claimant was a holder of an exclusive right to a burial 
plot. The tombstone marking the claimant’s burial plot appeared in the ﬁ lm 
as a backdrop, albeit brieﬂ y. Nothing on it could be read. Claims were made 
of intentional and ﬁ ction of emotional harm, breach of privacy, defamation, 
malicious falsehood, trespass and negligence. The court was prepared to accept 
that a tort of privacy formed part of New Zealand law relying very much on 
the Prosser formulation.  However in that case the claimant could not meet 
the requirement that the facts be ‘private facts’. The tombstone, after all, was 
in a public cemetery.  
In P v D (2000)20, the High Court held that publication by the media of 
information that a public ﬁ gure had been treated in a psychiatric hospital 
was a breach of privacy because the information was a private fact; the 
intended publication was a public disclosure; and disclosure would be highly 
offensive and objectionable to a person of ordinary sensibilities in the claimant’s 
position. Again the Prosser and Keeton formulation was applied.
Privacy features elsewhere in the law in New Zealand. Pursuant to 
section 4(1)(c) of the Broadcasting Act every broadcaster is responsible for 
maintaining in their programmes, and their presentations, standards which are 
consistent with ‘the privacy of the individual’.  There are seven Broadcasting 
Standards Authority privacy guidelines which are similar to the Prosser and 
Keeton formulation. One of the privacy principles provides that the protection 
of privacy also protects against public disclosure of some kinds of public facts. 
The public facts contemplated concern events (such as criminal behaviour) 
which have, in effect, become private again, for example through the passage 
of time. Nevertheless the public disclosure of private facts will have to be 
highly offensive to a reasonable person.  
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The BSA Privacy Guidelines were referred to in Hosking. In TV3 
Network Services v Broadcasting Standards Authority (1995)21, Chief Justice 
Eichelbaum agreed with the BSA that the broadcast of the fact that the 
complainant had been the victim of incest as had been her daughters was highly 
offensive and objectionable. It was thus in breach of the Privacy Principles. 
There are many BSA decisions on privacy issues including door stepping, 
electronic eavesdropping, personal abuse, privacy of rape victims, ﬁ lming at 
funerals and personal distress, suppression orders and so on.
As already referred to, privacy values underline much of the criminal 
process, for example:
Suppression orders.
Victims of sexual offences have always been entitled to privacy in 
the Court process.
The Victims  ʼ Rights Act 2002—section 7 speciﬁ cally refers to 
respect for the victimʼs dignity and privacy, and section 16 provides a 
presumption against the giving of a victimʼs address in evidence. 
The overall emphasis in the Act is on the privacy of victims.
The Law Commission Report ʻDelivering Justice for All  ʼ (March 
2004)22 wishes to give more emphasis to privacy in the court 
process.  The president of the Law Commission, Sir Geoffrey 
Palmer, in 2006 announced a major review of privacy law in New 
Zealand.
Inspection of court ﬁ les.  In R v Mahanga (2001)23 and Mafart v
TVNZ (2006)24, the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court have said 
that once a criminal trial has concluded there is more room to recog-
nise individual privacy interest. Protection of individual privacy of 
an accused was a legitimate factor to take into account in deciding 
whether the media were entitled to inspect the court records of a 
particular case.
The Noel Rogers v TVNZ (2006) case brings into sharp focus the 
impact of the developing tort of invasion of privacy, on the open 
justice system. The issue in that case is whether TVNZ should be 
injuncted from broadcasting a police videotaped confession that the 
Court of Appeal ruled inadmissable at Rogers  ʼtrial on the basis that 
it had been obtained in fundamental breach of his rights. After a 
ﬁ ve-week trial, a jury acquitted Rogers of a charge of murder. The 
•
•
•
•
•
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full Court of Appeal allowed TVNZʼs appeal after weighing the 
privacy interests of Rogers and the principle of open 
administration of justice, in particular as it relates to the court inad-
missibility ruling. Rogers then appealed to the Supreme Court. 
The appeal was heard on 14 December 2006. The Supreme Courtʼs 
decision is awaited with interest.
Reference should also be made to privacy and data protection in the 
Privacy Act 1993, although there is an exemption for the media in 
news and current affairs.
The International Covenants
While the International Covenants protect freedom of expression,  they also 
provide for privacy rights. Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights:
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence ...  Everyone has the right to the 
protection of the law against such interference or attacks.
Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his 
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on 
his honour and reputation.
And as mentioned in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights:
Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence.
Conclusion
Privacy issues arise in many different areas of the law. Two recent 
examples of this are the US Supreme Court decisions in 2005 in Lawrence v 
Texas25 and US v American Librarian Association Inc.26  In the ﬁ rst, the court 
struck down Texas legislation prohibiting two consenting adults engaging in 
sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The second, struck down 
childrenʼs internet protection legislation. The majority of the Supreme Court 
•
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was prepared to accept that close monitoring of computer users would be 
more intrusive than the use of ﬁ ltering software and would turn librarians 
into compliance ofﬁ cers.
In this respect, I have not ventured into the world of internet privacy, 
and such issues as tracking and snifﬁ ng, cookies and web bugs, scrapping, 
interception and monitoring of emails, spam, and email harvesting and the like. 
There are some important cases in this area.  The main concern, of course, is 
that few internet users really understand the use to which these devices are put 
and how they impact upon privacy. The media could well explore this area.
I have also not referred to the important issue of workplace privacy.  Again, 
privacy and conﬁ dentiality arise in such broad areas as evaluative material, 
surveillance cameras, random drug testing and the like. Again a fruitful area 
for the media.  Nor for that matter have I considered self-regulation by the 
media through international and national codes of ethics and national press 
complaints commissions.
However, I hope that the cases that I have referred to will highlight what 
I believe to be one of the most important issues facing the media today as 
we become a truly global village in the information age—that is balancing 
freedom of expression with privacy values and interests.  
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